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Since 2008, after a period of relative growth 
and social stability, the situation in Tajikistan 
has been steadily deteriorating, leading to 
increased speculation that the country could 
emerge as a failing state.1 Given its proximity 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the role it 
plays in the Northern Distribution Network 
– a line that funnels military supplies from 
Europe to NATO ISAF troops in Afghanistan 
–  the  ramifications  of  potential  instability 
in  Tajikistan  would  resonate  beyond  the 
country. The  current  briefing  assesses  to 
what extent such danger is in fact real by 
outlining developments in the key areas of 
economy and security, and examining the 
regime’s  capacity  to  cope  with  emerging 
challenges.  The  briefing  concludes  with 
recommendations for the EU and an outlook 
for future.
Energy 
Tajikistan is a poor country in a troublesome 
neighbourhood.  According  to  Tajikistan’s 
State Committee of Statistics, 53 per cent 
of population is poor and 17 per cent, very 
poor. Average salary barely reaches US$50 
per month.2 The country is experiencing a 
reverse industrialisation: 77 per cent of its 
1    See  ‘Tajikistan:  on  the  Road  to  Failure’, 
International  Crisis  Group, Asia  Report  N°162, 
12 February 2009, Dushanbe – Brussels.  
2   Victoria Panfilova, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 
August  2009  at  http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.
php?st=1260225120 
population  lives  in  rural  areas,  compared 
with 63 per cent in the mid-1980s.
Tajikistan’s  development  is  seriously 
constrained  by  energy  deficit.  Its  vast 
hydropower  potential  remains  merely  a 
potential,  while  the  country  suffers  from 
acute shortages in winter months. Energy is 
a bone of contention among the countries in 
the region. In November 2009 Kazakhstan 
accused  Tajikistan  of  misappropriating 
electricity  from  the  unified  Central  Asian 
system  and  threatened  to  leave  the 
regional power grid.3 Also in November the 
management of the Sangtuda (a hydropower 
station in which Russia has a 75 percent 
stake) informed the Tajik government that 
it plans to halt production due to consumer 
debt, which at the end of October constituted 
US$  30  million  and  which  the  authorities 
did little to repay. Given the circumstances, 
continuing production does not appear to 
make economic sense.4
In  December  2009  Uzbekistan  left  the 
Central Asian  grid,  depriving Tajikistan  of 
3   ‘Uzbekistan Withdrawing From Regional Power 
Grid,’ 1 December 2009, RFE/RL Newsline, http://
www.rferl.org/content/Uzbekistan_Withdrawing_
From_Regional_Power_Grid/1892220.html
4   Victoria Panfilova, ‘Москва погрузит Душанбе 
в  темноту:  Сангтудинская  ГЭС-1  может 
остановиться из-за долгов потребителей,’ 16 
November 2009, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, at
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-11-16/1_dushanbe.
html
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ISBN  978-92-9079-960-31.2 billion kilowatt hours of Turkmen electricity delivered through 
Uzbekistan, upon which the country depends on during winter.5 
This development may have serious consequences for Tajikistan 
for winter 2009/10 winter and for irrigation in summer 2010. The 
energy  situation  has  not  been  helped  by  the  decline  of  coal 
mining in the north and by the redirection of electricity from social 
needs to aluminium production at TALCO.6 In the early 2000s 
the plant used 32 per cent of the locally produced electricity and 
the rest of the required energy was bought in Uzbekistan, yet by 
2008 TALCO consumed up to 43 per cent of total supplies, while 
households consumed just 28 percent.7
Energy  problems  reflect  Tajikistan’s  poor  record  in  attracting 
investment  to  strategic  sectors.  The  country  suffers  from 
underinvestment  that  affects  infrastructure,  industry  and 
agriculture alike. The government was successful in attracting 
investment from Iran and China,8 and hopes to receive another 
US$3 billion from the latter. However, it is unclear how the country 
would repay the Chinese loans; it could potentially fall into a 
debt trap and offer assets to China in lieu of payments. On a 
positive note, steps were taken to improve the business climate. 
Legislation introduced in July 2009 streamlined the process of 
registering a business. New rules allow entrepreneurs to deal 
with only the State Tax Committee during the registration process. 
As a result, the country jumped up seven places from 159 to 152 
out of 183 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business study, 
making the country a ‘top 10 reformer’ worldwide.9 There are 
few signs so far that investors are convinced, given Tajikistan’s 
previous record of foreign businesses been pushed out of the 
country. 
Despite problems with the IMF and other international loans, 
expensive  TALCO  litigation  in  European  courts,  the  global 
financial crisis and energy shortages; the leadership is showing 
no signs of panic. It is adamant that the country’s major assets 
will not be sold to foreigners. In February 2009 the parliament 
approved the bill to list Nurek and Rogun hydropower stations 
on the River Vakhsh, as well as TALCO, as strategic state assets 
excluded from privatisation. This gave a signal to Russian – and 
other potential investors – that they should abandon their hopes 
of  ever  owning  these  objects.10  Still,  the  government  offered 
silver and gold deposits for tender despite its earlier reluctance 
to privatise mining. Tenders for ‘Big Konimansur’ deposit which 
5   Konstantin Parshin, ‘Tajikistan: Dushanbe May Stop Water Flow As 
Uzbekistan Pulls Plug On Power,’ 30 November 2009, Eurasia Insight 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav113009.shtml
6    Tajik  Aluminium  Plant,  formerly  known  as  TadAZ,  a  state-owned 
enterprise and a flagship of industry in Tajikistan.
7   ‘Emergency Project Paper On A Proposed Grant In The Amount Of 
SDR 4.0 million (US$6.5 Million Equivalent), Republic Of Tajikistan For 
An Energy Emergency Recovery Assistance Project,’ Report no: 43333-
TJ, 18 April, 2008.
8    Victoria  Panfilova,  ‘Рахмон  посеребрил  Поднебесную:  Россия 
не  получит  обещанное  Таджикистаном  крупнейшее  в  мире 
месторождение серебра,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 November 2009, 
at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-11-12/1_rahmon.html
9   ‘Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times,’ International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank, September 2009, quoted in 
David Trilling, ‘Tajikistan: Business Climate Improving, But Corruption 
Remains An Obstacle To Investment,’ 5 November 2009, Eurasia Insight 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav1104509.
shtml
10    ‘ТАЛКО  и  Рогун  не  могут  быть  приватизированы.  Ключевые 
объекты таджикской экономики остаются у Душанбе,’ 27 February 
2009, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1235682540
contains 90 per cent of Tajikistan’s silver reserves have been 
announced,11 and so were tenders for the Shahbas gold deposit 
in the north, which is estimated to contain 75 tonnes of gold.12 It 
is believed that deposits are likely to go to China. 
In an effort to achieve energy self-sufficiency, the government 
tried unsuccessfully to attract investment in Rogun hydropower 
station, but it emerged that expensive, technically complicated 
and politically problematic Rogun could be attractive to investors 
only if offered as a package with TALCO, as the collapse of 
the investment deal with RusAl highlighted. Once RusAL was 
made to understand that its appetite for a controlling stake in 
the  aluminium  plant  would  not  be  satisfied,  its  enthusiasm 
for  developing  electricity  production  for  its  own  sake  waned 
significantly. Presently, the government plans to finalise Rogun 
construction  out  of  its  pocket,  which  would  require  between 
US$ 3 and 6 billion, and, after Uzbekistan’s decision to leave 
the regional grid, it feels that it is within its rights to disregard 
potential  opposition  from  Tashkent.  The  2010  state  budget 
allocates US$160 million for Rogun, while US$ 800 million are 
required to launch the first phase. 
There is no consensus regarding whether Rogun would indeed 
solve Tajikistan’s energy problems, even if more funds could be 
found.  Many  within  the  international  development  community 
believe that there are politically easier and more cost-effective 
means to generate energy. Yet for Tajikistan’s leadership Rogun 
is a matter of national pride and a hope; realisation of the project 
would allow the country to become independent of its neighbours, 
while also reviving the country’s industrial potential. 
Security 
The  other  area  of  concern  is  the  growing  religiosity  among 
the  population  of  this  secular  state,  against  a  backdrop  of 
economic  and  social  hardship.  The  expanding  influence  of 
Islam on everyday life is reflected in changes in behaviour and 
customs. Alcohol production has been scaled down due to low 
demand,13 and an increasing number of restaurants have banned 
consumption of alcohol on the premises. More girls try to wear 
rusari head wear at school instead of permitted national dress.14 
On the whole, forces of religious conservatism are becoming 
more pronounced, especially among younger people.
In the eyes of the ruling establishment, Islamist-related terrorism 
remains the main threat. According to the Ministry of Interior, 
in the period 1995–2009, 98 acts of terrorism were registered 
in Tajikistan, with 57 of them solved.15 Islamist-related violence 
11    ‘Власти  Таджикистана  выставили  на  торги  крупное 
месторождение серебра,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 November 2009, 
at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-11-24/6_tajikistan.html
12   ‘Золотоносное месторождение Шахбас Таджикистан выставит 
на  тендер,’  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  19  November  2009,  http://www.
ng.ru/cis/2009-11-19/6_tadjikistan.html
13   In nine months of 2009 33,000 decilitres of vodka was produced in 
Tajikistan, 11,000 less than in the nine months of 2008, in Tilav Rasul-
Zade  ‘Винно-водочный  бизнес  Таджикистана  терпит  крах.  Грядет 
«сухой  закон»?’  29  October  2009,  http://www.ferghana.ru/article.
php?id=6351
14    Tilav  Rasul-Zade,  ‘В  Таджикистане  школьницам  запрещают 
приходить  на  занятия  в  мусульманском  платке  «русари»,’  17 
September 2009, http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6303
15   Nargis Hamrabayeva, 10 December 2009, Asia-Plus at http://www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1260429180
2  EUCAM Policy Brief No. 12appears to be on the rise. According to the deputy chair of the 
Committee on National Security Abdullo Navzarov, in 2007–09 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) members conducted five 
bomb raids, as a result of which 13 people died. In 2009 28 IMU 
members were detained, compared to 18 in 2008.16 A number of 
violent incidents erupted in mid-2009: a suspected IMU member 
was killed outside the capital in a shoot-out with security forces,17 
arrests of alleged IMU members increased during summer and 
the summit of the leaders of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Russia in Dushanbe was disturbed by bomb explosions.18 
The  government’s  policy  is  to  stress  the  distinctly  secular 
character of the state, and to contain and control religious life. 
Following  the  2007–08  registration  of  mosques,  when  many 
unregistered mosques were closed and some even demolished, 
there are only 3000 mosques, of which just 259 are juma (Friday) 
mosques and 18 Madrasas in a country of 7.2 million.19 In June 
2009  President  Rahmon  announced  his  discouragement  of 
making the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, this year, calling on 
wealthy people to donate their savings to charity instead. Every 
year 4,500 Tajiks perform the Hajj which costs an average of 
US$3,000 per person.20
Repression of previously-tolerated movements has increased. 
In January 2009 the Supreme Court of Tajikistan ordered the 
prohibition  of  activities  by  Salafi  adherents,  and  forbid  the 
importation  and  distribution  of  their  religious  material.  The 
Salafis, numbering between 10,000 and 20,000, were portrayed 
as ‘the true heart of opposition, promoters of popular discontent, 
who could at any moment promote a struggle to overthrow the 
established order’. 21
Jamaat-ut Tabligh also was banned, with adherents suppressed. 
In September 2009 the Supreme Court sentenced five members 
to prison terms of between three and six years. Another trial of 
56 people accused of belonging to the Jamaat-ut Tabligh began 
in December. The government described Tabligh as a hard-line 
extremist group based in India and Pakistan which engages in 
extremist activities in Tajikistan.22
At the same time, ex-field commanders from the civil war era 
(1992–97) continue to be a source of security problems in former 
opposition areas. In February 2008 an incident took place in 
Gharm when an attempt to arrest the head of organised crime 
police squad Mirzohoja Ahmadov, an ex-United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) commander, resulted in fatalities among troops sent to 
16   Novosti Kazakhstan Information Agency, 2 November 2009
http://www.newskaz.ru/world_news/20091102/346560.html
17    ‘Tajik  Gunfight  Kills  Suspected  IMU  Member’,  10  August  2009, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Gunfight_Kills_Suspected_IMU_
Member/1796552.html
18    Lev  Makedonov,  ‘Подполковника  заминировали  к  визиту 
Медведева’ [Lieutenant Colonel was mined for Medvedev’s visit], 31 
July 2009 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2009/07/31_a_3229694.shtml
19   According to Minister of Culture Mirzoshohrukh Asrori, in ‘Ислам 
стал официальной религией в Таджикистане,’ 6 March 2009, http://
news.invictory.org/issue22081.html
20   Konstantin Parshin, ‘President Rahmon appeals to Tajik believers to 
make charitable donations’,17 July 2009, Asia-Plus, http://www.asiaplus.
tj/en/articles/286/3869.html
21   Asia News, 9 January 2009, at http://www.speroforum.com/a/17609/
Supreme-court-of-Tajikistan-outlaws-Salafi-Islam
22    RFE/RL  Newsline,  10  December  2009,  at  http://www.rferl.
org/content/Trial_Of_Suspected_Islamic_Extremists_Opens_In_
Dushanbe/1900084.html
arrest him.23 More serious fighting broke out in Tavildara in July 
2009. Shaykh Nemat Azizov, who led a group of militants, was 
killed by the Interior Ministry’s Special Forces when they were 
tracked down in Tavildara. The Interior Ministry claimed Shaykh 
Nemat had entered Tajikistan to sell drugs from Afghanistan to 
fund militant operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.24 
The last prominent civil war hero from the opposition side also 
met his death in July 2009. Mirzo Ziyeev, who held the position of 
civil emergencies’ minister until his removal from the government 
in 2006, joined up with Mullo Abdullo, his civil war comrade-in-
arms. Abdullo’s 100-strong detachment allegedly crossed from 
Afghanistan where his fighters had been based for years, and 
raided police and administration buildings in Tavildara. Security 
forces countered the attacks, in which Ziyeev and five Russian 
citizens  were  killed,  alongside  with  other  fighters.25  Ziyeev’s 
switching  sides  with  the  militants  demonstrated  the  dangers 
of letting dismissed security actors lead an independent life; a 
‘mistake’ the Tajik leadership are unlikely to repeat in future. 
Developments such as these emphasise the interconnectedness 
of security in Tajikistan with that of Afghanistan. In September 
the Taliban stepped up their activities in Kunduz province close 
to Tajikistan, which is controlled by German ISAF troops. They 
seized  two  fuel  tankers  and  attacked  military  vehicles.  Non-
Afghan militants of Central Asian origin assumed to belong to 
the IMU were moved to Kunduz from the tribal areas of Pakistan, 
including with the use of military helicopters. 26 
In the worst case scenario of Taliban attacks from across the 
border, Tajikistan’s security forces would be unable to defend the 
country on their own for an extended period. In this case, article 
IV of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which 
stipulates  that  an  attack  on  one  member  of  the  organisation 
means an attack on all, would be evoked. All necessary means, 
including the use of force, would be employed by CSTO members 
to resist such attacks.27 
State Resilience
Tajikistan is facing multiple challenges, but this does not mean 
that  the  country  is  on  its  way  to  collapse. Tajikistan  remains 
a  resilient,  if  not  a  very  inspiring  state.  The  regime  has  a 
23   ‘Murder Invokes Ghosts of Tajikistan’s Past’, IWPR Reporting Central 
Asia, No. 533, 20 February 2008.
24    Andrew  McGregor,  ‘Counterterrorism  Operations  Continue  in 
Tajikistan,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor vol. 7 issue 25, 
13  August  2009  http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35410&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHas
h=e6ebe55615
25    Bruce  Pannier, Abubakar  Siddique  ‘Ten  Years After  IMU  Raids, 
Central  Asia  Still  Battling  Militants,’  6  August,  2009  http://www.rferl.
org/content/Ten_Years_After_IMU_Raids_Central_Asia_Still_Battling_
Militants/1794035.html There is no clarity about the circumstances in 
which Ziyeev died. According to the official version, he was killed by 
Abdullo militants when he tired to persuade them to negotiate with the 
government. Other versions are that he was shot by the government 
troops during fighting in Tavildara or that he did not side up with Abdullo 
at all, but was shot dead pre-emptively, so he does not join Adbullo.  
26    Sanobar  Shermatova,  ‘Should  Central  Asia  Fear  Taleban 
Spillover?’IWPR  Reporting  Central Asia  no.  595,  6  November  2009, 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=357261&apc_state=henprca
27   Colonel General Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary General, Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation, speaking on ‘The Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation and Regional Security Challenges in Eurasia,’ 8 December 
2009, International Institute for Security Studies, London.
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unwelcome developments through state action. It provides short-
term stability at the cost of substantive reform. The weakness of 
the current state is not in its tendency towards crisis and failure, 
but in its inability to act as a developmental engine in the long-
term interests of the country. 
Three  groups  of  factors  –  social,  political  and  external  –  act 
against the possibility of major destabilisation.  
Why people obey
The  state  continues  to  place  considerable,  often  impossible 
demands  upon  the  population.  Recent  examples  include  the 
announcement that each family would have to contribute around 
$700 for construction of Rogun,28that citizens would have to pay 
for provision of any official information by state bodies,29 and 
the drafting of state sector employees and even those in private 
companies who provide services to the state, to ‘voluntarily’ pick 
cotton in the autumn 2009 harvest.30 Still, most people either 
obey these escalating demands or find ways of working around 
the system. There are no protests, as there was a remarkably 
low level of protest during winter 2008 when energy shortages 
were dire and children were dying of cold. The question is why. 
One explanation is that people are dependent upon the state. 
The state has a bureaucratic apparatus which covers the whole 
territory and provides formal services to the population – as well 
as exchanging informal favours - by issuing documents, permits, 
licenses,  state  registries.  It  can  make  life  hard  by  denying 
them. The local authorities can threaten various bureaucratic 
punishments, such as expelling children from schools, prohibiting 
farmers  from  exporting  their  products  beyond  the  provincial 
boundaries, disadvantaging them over land allocation etc. Civic 
awareness remains low and people are often unaware of their 
rights.  For  example,  although  the  state  adopted  legislation 
prohibiting the sending of children to pick cotton, few are aware 
of it in cotton-producing Khatlon where the authorities act as if 
nothing has changed.31 
Symbolic means which remind the citizens of the existence of 
the state are important in ensuring compliance, with portraits, 
elections,  national  holidays  and  military  parades  looming 
large in the public domain.32 The system’s resemblance of the 
Soviet institutional pattern also conveys a sense of familiarity 
and  continuity  with  the  past,  which  remind  the  population  of 
stability. This is reinforced by the sense that little can be gained 
by protesting, of which the experience of the civil war serves a 
powerful reminder. In the run-up to the civil war of 1992, citizens 
28   See, for instance, ‘В Таджикистане открываются пункты приема 
средств на Рогунскую ГЭС’ 10 December 2009 http://www.centrasia.ru/
newsA.php?st=1260437400
29    А.  Reutov,  ‘Таджикским  властям  спустили  план  продажности. 
Даже за разговор с чиновником гражданам придется платить,’ 27 
November 2009, Kommersant-Daily № 222 (4277), 27 November 2009, 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1259303820 
30   Tavil Rasul-Zade, ‘Таджикистан: Новый сезон хлопкового рабства. 
Приглашаются все желающие,’ 20 October 2009 http://www.ferghana.
ru/article.php?id=6342
31    ‘Tajikistan:  Cotton  Harvest  Relies  Heavily  On  Child  Labour,’  3 
November 2009, Eurasia Insight http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/
insightb/articles/eav110309.shtml
32   ‘Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation 
and Symbolic Power,’ Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, issue 7, September 
2009, pp. 1095 – 1121.
had been convinced that wealth existed in the republic, and the 
problem lay in uneven distribution, as representatives of one 
region were unjustly deprived while others were privileged. At 
present many believe that the state coffers are largely empty 
and that it has little to offer to its people. Moreover, the deficit 
of  public  information,  low  geographical  mobility  and  mutual 
suspicion among representatives of different regional groupings 
create powerful barriers against the solidarity needed to mobilise 
around a common agenda. 
Control Machine
The  regime  successfully  manages  to  project  a  public  image 
of  strength,  which  is  what  matters. The  state  does  not  need 
to exercise total control or a high level of repression since the 
society  already  has  become  increasingly  passive  over  the 
years. Still, it has a considerable and diverse security sector 
with institutions of control inherited from the Soviet era, such as 
the Ministries for State Security and the Interior, and structures 
created as a result of the civil war (Ministry of Defence) and 
post-war developments, such as Border Troops or the Ministry of 
Emergencies. Although the security sector looms large, civilian 
control by the President and his entourage is firmly entrenched. 
The presence and visibility of security sector agents throughout 
the country maintains a sense that everybody is being watched, 
although this is not necessarily the case.
Manipulation of political opponents in and outside the government 
is a skill that President Emomali Rahmon has mastered. The 
period 2004–2009 witnessed frequent rotations of appointments 
including persecution and imprisonments, but more often than 
not officials did not fall from grace entirely, but were allocated 
less prestigious positions to ensure the preservation of the elite 
cartel. The forthcoming February 2010 parliamentary elections 
are likely to perform this function of turning unwanted officials 
into parliamentary dignitaries without disgracing them. This does 
little to improve the government’s professional capacities, but 
creates a certain predictability for political elites. 
The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) is allowed to operate as 
the main opposition party insofar as it does not step out of the 
government-provided space, disabling it from emerging as a force 
for radical transformation of the existing order. In the absence 
of  political  agents  who  could  use  compromising  information 
to challenge the leadership, the majority of society is largely 
unaware of the true state of affairs in the country and is inclined 
to believe the official explanations that hardships are beyond the 
government’s control. Thus, elite stability is key, while popular 
consent to rule can be manipulated to a certain degree. 
External factors
Several  external  factors  also  work  towards  stability. Adverse 
effects  of  instability  in  Afghanistan  feed  the  fear  of  chaos. 
Uzbekistan acts as a convenient and vicious enemy, every so 
often taking new steps to disadvantage Tajikistan. Thus, many 
of  the  government’s  failures  can  be  easily  explained  by  the 
unhelpful  policies  of  the  Karimov  leadership.33  Cultivation  of 
an ‘enemy image’ resonates well with the Tajik majority, which 
is inclined to regard President Rahmon as a bastion against 
the Uzbek domination, allowing the regime to rally around the 
nationalist agenda. 
33   Arkadii Dubnov, Vremya Novostei, 10 December 2009 http://www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1260429120
4  EUCAM Policy Brief No. 12Despite the financial crisis, labour migration to Russia has not 
altered  much,  taking  potential  ‘angry  young  men’  out  of  the 
local situation, while their remittances create a social safety net. 
Labour remittances are estimated to constitute 46 percent of 
Tajikistan’s GDP. Returns of migrants to Tajikistan have not been 
massive and remittances grew again in 2009. According to data 
from CONTACT, an international system of financial transfers, 
in  the  second  quarter  of  2009  the  transfers  from  Russia  to 
Tajikistan grew 53 per cent compared to the first quarter. In three 
quarters  of  2009,  the  average  monthly  transfer  from  Russia 
to Tajikistan stood at US$444 per capita.34 The Russian State 
Statistics Committee reported slightly different figures showing 
that remittances dropped, but still constituted US$ 1300 million 
in three quarters of 2009.35 Those who lose their jobs prefer to 
stay in Russia in the hope that the situation will improve rather 
than returning home to labour in the cotton fields. 
Lastly,  international  assistance  plays  a  role,  meeting  the 
government’s  most  urgent  needs  in  the  social  sector  and 
mitigating popular discontent. Foreign aid allows the leadership 
to  take  credit  for  undertaking  development  projects,  which  it 
presents as state authored, thus strengthening its legitimacy. 
However,  the  significance  of  aid  should  not  be  exaggerated. 
Tajikistan  is  far  from  an  aid-dependant  country:  in  2007  the 
net ODA to GNI ratio amounted to 6.1 per cent and net ODA 
constituted $221 million.36  
Implications for the EU
The EU needs to keep its expectations of what can be achieved 
in Tajikistan proportional to the context and be mindful that its 
political system may not be conducive to any substantial reform, 
as  its  resilience  lies  in  projection  of  power  and  predictability. 
The EU does not have significant leverage to influence political 
outcomes, while geopolitical rivalries enable the Tajik government 
to  shift  between  different  poles  if  pressure  from  international 
actor or another becomes uncomfortable. 
The  EU  needs  to  assess  which  of  its  available  instruments 
are  conducive  to  the  operational  environment.  Problems  that 
Tajikistan faces – be they energy shortages, lack of basic food 
commodities  or  spillover  of  instability  from Afghanistan  –  are 
unique in Central Asia. For example, Tajikistan is the only state 
that  potentially  requires  large-scale  humanitarian  assistance. 
The  EU  needs  to  take  this  into  account  in  the  pursuit  of  its 
regional strategy, as it is unclear that at present Tajikistan has an 
adequate capacity to benefit from it. 
Until a solution to the energy problems is found, the country 
will balance on the edge of a humanitarian catastrophe every 
winter, requiring donors to be on standby to provide relief aid. 
The  EU,  in  collaboration  with  other  donors,  needs  to  help 
Tajikistan in elaborating a sustainable, realistic strategy on how 
to satisfy domestic demand for energy, first and foremost in the 
34    Rasul  Shodon,  ‘Таджикские  мигранты  в  среднем  за  раз 
отправляют на Родину $444, - Центробанк РФ,’ 10 December 2009, 
http://www.asiaplus.tj/news/49/60240.html
35   Sergei Rassov, CA-News, 9 November 2009, http://www.centrasia.
ru/newsA.php?st=1257837420
36   http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/20/1882885.gif
social sector. This would include an assessment of viability of 
the construction of Rogun hydropower station in the conditions 
of absence of foreign investment, use of domestically-produced 
electricity  for  aluminium  production  instead  of  household 
needs and options for developing alternative means of energy 
production. 
The  European  Commission  started  to  provide  funding  for 
Islamic–secular  dialogue  through  its  European  Instrument 
for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR);  for  instance,  it 
allocated funds to International Alert, a UK NGO, for a ‘Dialogue 
for a Policy on the Relationship between the Secular State and 
Religion.’ Such steps are welcome, but much more needs to be 
done to improve analysis and get a more nuanced picture of the 
diversity of religious life in Tajikistan to generate concrete ideas 
of what can be done to ensure peaceful co-existence between 
the state and religion. 
The  decision  not  to  engage  with  Russia,  especially  in  the 
security  sphere,  was  unfortunate,  as  it  undermined  the 
leverage the EU might have had on the Tajik leadership and it 
prevented pulling the strengths of different actors together. In 
the current deteriorating security context the EU needs to step 
up its operational consultation and cooperation with Russia in 
relation to the Tajik – Afghan border and work out a plan of joint 
preventative measures in case Taliban advances threaten to spill 
over into Tajikistan. 
Outlook
While short-term disruption of stability is unlikely given that the 
regime maintains a firm grip on power, longer-term prospects 
appear  rather  bleak,  as  demodernisation  of  the  country 
deepens, and education and health sectors continue to decline. 
Massive labour migration to Russia has proven to be a long-
term phenomenon which the financial crisis has not significantly 
affected. This trend has profound implications for the national 
economy and social life, which have not yet been fully analysed, 
but which international development actors would have to take 
into account in their future policy-planning. 
The  energy  fallout  between  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  which 
further  aggravated  their  precarious  relationship  threaten  to 
unleash rounds of retributions and obstruct cross-border transit. 
Since  they  are  both  key  components  in  the  supply  chain  for 
NATO ISAF troops, the flow of supplies into Afghanistan could 
experience disruptions.
The developments in Afghanistan over the next eighteen months 
will be key, given the 2011 deadline for the beginning of the 
withdrawal of US troops announced by President Obama. The 
dangers  are  that  IMU  fighters  in  northern Afghanistan  would 
seek to disrupt the new supply line through Central Asia and 
may mount armed challenges to the secular regimes in Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Thus, the escalation of hostilities in northern 
Afghanistan carries the risk that the Central Asian region could 
be  dragged  into  the  Afghan  conflict.  If  fighting  intensifies, 
Tajikistan is likely to be more affected than it has been thus far, 
and  security  may  again  emerge  as  an  overarching  concern, 
compared to which other priorities would be less important.
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About EUCAM
The  Fundación  para  las  Relaciones  Internacionales  y  el  Diálogo  Exterior 
(FRIDE), Spain, in co-operation with the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS),  Belgium,  has  launched  a  joint  project  entitled  “EU  Central Asia 
Monitoring (EUCAM)”. The (EUCAM) initiative is an 18-month research and 
awareness-raising exercise supported by several EU member states and civil 
society organisations which aims: 
- to raise the profile of the EU-Central Asia Strategy; 
- to strengthen debate about the EU-Central Asia relationship and the role of 
the Strategy in that relationship; 
- to enhance accountability through the provision of high quality information 
and analysis; 
-  to  promote  mutual  understanding  by  deepening  the  knowledge  within 
European and Central Asian societies about EU policy in the region; and 
- to develop ‘critical’ capacity within the EU and Central Asia through the 
establishment of a network that links communities concerned with the role of 
the EU in Central Asia.
EUCAM focuses on four priority areas in order to find a mix between the broad 
political ambitions of the Strategy and the narrower practical priorities of EU 
institutions and member state assistance programmes:
•  Democracy and Human Rights 
•  Security and Stability 
•  Energy and Natural Resources 
•  Education and Social Relations 
EUCAM will produce the following series of publications:
 - A bi-monthly newsletter on EU-Central Asia relations will be produced and 
distributed broadly by means of an email list server using the CEPS and FRIDE 
networks. The newsletter contains the latest documents on EU-Central Asia 
relations, up-to-date information on the EU’s progress in implementing the 
Strategy and developments in Central Asian countries.
  -  Policy  briefs  will  be  written  by  permanent  and  ad  hoc  Working  Group 
members. The majority of the papers examine issues related to the four core 
themes  identified  above,  with  other  papers  commissioned  in  response  to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This  monitoring  exercise  is  implemented  by  an  Expert  Working  Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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